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FACTUAL STATEMENT
The Stansbury Road was constructed in 1949-50 across private property pursuant to
written easements by two smelting companies for the purpose of mining an oolitic sands deposit
located about halfway into Section 16 of Township 1 North, Range 6 West (R. 302-303). In
1954, at the request of one of the parties operating on the Island (other than Ed Cassity or the
Castagnos),1 Tooele County commenced occasionally grading the Stansbury Road. (R 1140,
R 1151 at 431-32, 435-36.) That same year, Tooele County designated the road as a class B
public road. (R. 1140.) The record does not afford any explanation as to why Tooele County
designated the Stansbury Road to be a class B public road five years before the expiration of the
ten years required to dedicate a road. Appellants, however, did not learn of this designation until
1989-1990. (R. 1150 at 316.)
Pursuant to a written easement, in 1965 U.S. Magnesium, a predecessor in interest to U.S.
Magnesium Corp ("referred herein together with its predecessor entities as "MagCorp"),
constructed a road from the MagCorp parcel to the Stansbury Road. (R. 1149 at 150.) Since that
time, the MagCorp parcel has been posted no trespassing at the point where the Stansbury Road
enters onto that property. (R. 1149 at 193, 151-52, 112; R. 1151 at404,R 1401.) After crossing
the MagCorp parcel, the Stansbury Road becomes part of MagCorp's North Dike, which is the
private property of MagCorp. (R. 1150 at 281.) Once the Stansbury Road enters onto the
MagCorp property there are no side roads that afford the public access to either the sovereign
lands located below the meander line of the Great Salt Lake or public lands located above that

1

The only other party the record reveals was operating out on the Island at that time were the
smelting companies that built the road. The reasonable deduction to be drawn from this testimony,
therefore, is that it was the smelting companies that requested the county to maintain the road.
1

meander line. Consistent therewith, the record does not evidence a single member of the public
who used the portion of the road across the MagCorp parcel to access either sovereign or public
lands. In fact, during the trial the State at best only introduced evidence of three public users
during the entire history of that segment of the Stansbury Road. (R. 1402-05, 1396-1401, 15191525.) Conversely, Appellants introduced overwhelming evidence through both the State's
witnesses and their own that the vast majority of people using the Stansbury Road stopped and
turned around when they came into view of the no trespassing sign posted at the en1 ranee to the
MagCorp parcel. (R. 1149 at 111-121, R. 1151 at 430-31, R 402-05.)
The Stansbury Road affords access to three Side Roads known as the South Road, the
Pass Canyon Road and the Cable Gate Road. Although there did not exist any no trespassing
signs at the entrance to these Side Roads, no trespassing signs existed where the Stansbury Road
first enters on to private property and at each location where the road left the property of one
landowner and entered the property of another. (R. 1150 at 293-96, R. 1137, R. 1150.) These no
trespassing signs were placed to the side of the road facing on-coming. (R. 1150 at 293-96.)
Dale Castagno testified that the private property on the Island had always been posted.
(R. 1948.) Likewise, John Bleazard testified that the foregoing signage existed for as long as he
could remember. (R. 1150 at 295.)
Throughout the history of the Stansbury Road, the landowners (or their lessees) who used
the Island as winter range ordered trespassers to leave their private property, including the
Stansbury Road and Side Roads. Dale Castagno testified that during the 1950s not only did he
order trespassers to leave but that he also witnessed his father Stanley Castagno and Ed Cassity
do the same. (R. 1151 at 412, 418, 423-25; R 1939-43.) In these instances, Dale Castagno
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testified that they would order the trespassers to go to the south end of the Island where public
lands are located. (Id) Moreover, this practice was not limited to people who were shouting
guns, although that was the primary reason people trespassed in the winter. (Id: R. 1151 at
411-12.)
From 1960-1975, Dale Castagno leased the Castagno parcels to winter livestock.
(K 1151 at 416.) During that time period, Dale Castagno testified he continued to order
trespassers to leave and he witnessed Ed Cassity doing the same. (R. 1151 at 416-18, 423-25;
R, 1945-46.) Two of the State's witnesses, affiant Keith E. Wanlass and Charles Durfee, also
testified that they witnessed Ed Cassity order people to leave his private property. (R. 14981502; 1272-78; R. 1151 at 449-57.)
Following Ed Cassity's death in 1977, John Bleazard assumed the responsibility of
running Six Mile Ranch Company. (R. 1150 at 305.) Between 1977 and 1993, John Bleazard
testified that he frequently ordered trespassers to leave the private property, including the
Stansbury Road and Side Roads (R. 1150 at 310-12, 324-25, 371, 384-86.) From 1983-1993,
Craig Smith, an employee of Six Mile Ranch Company, testified that he did the same. (R. 1151
at 428-30.) Although John Bleazard testified he did not always order people who were not
engaged in objectionable conduct to leave, if people were engaging in objectionable conduct
such as hunting, shooting or otherwise not behaving he would always order them to leave the
private property by ordering them to go to the south end of Island. John Bleazard testified that in
the late 1970s and continuing through the 1980s, he often sought the help of law enforcement to
prevent trespass. (R 1150 at 314-15.) When these efforts proved unsuccessful in 1989-1990, he
sought help from the Tooele County Commissioners. (R 1150 at 315-316.) It was at this time
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that he first learned the Stansbury Road had been designated to be a class B public road. (Id)
Although Appellants disputed that the Stansbury Road was a public road, to avoid the expense of
unnecessary litigation, at the suggestion of a Tooele County Commissioners, Appellants and
other landowners sought and eventually succeeded in having the Tooele County Commission
enact Ordinance 93-9. (R. 1150 at 316-18, R. 1151 at 442.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court was correct in ruling that the Side Roads were not dedicated to the public.
This judgment is supported by evidence trespassers were routinely ordered to leave those roads
and adjoining lands, that the lands were posted "no trespassing" and that Appellants sought the
assistance of law enforcement to prevent trespass.
Conversely, the trial court erred in concluding that the Stansbury Road was dedicated to
the public. Not only do the trial court's finding that trespassers were "occasionally" ordered off
the Stansbury Road and routinely ordered off the lands adjacent thereto compel the conclusion
the public's use was not continuous, but the fact that landowners knowingly and willingly
allowed the public to recreate on their private lands evidences the use of the Stansbury Road was
permissive. In any event, the evidence does not support the trial court's ruling that a public
dedication occurred across the MagCorp parcel to the meander line of the Great Salt Lake.
Furthermore, the MagCorp parcel was owned by the State of Utah until 1989 and, therefore,
could not have been dedicated to the public as a matter of law.
Finally, the trial court erred in holding Ordinance 93-9 invalid without first ascertaining
whether the sovereign lands abutted a "public" road.

4

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
SIDE ROADS HAD NOT BEEN CONTINUOUSLY USED BY THE
PUBLIC.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) three elements must be proven to establish that a
road has been dedicated to the public: (1) continuous use; (2) as a public thoroughfare; (3) for a
period often years. Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997) (interpreting the
earlier version of the statute, former Utah Code Ann. §27-12-89 (1963)); AWINC Corp. v.
Simonsen, 2005 Ut. App. 168, f 11, 112 P.3d 1228.
Under Utah law, therefore, the public's use of a road must be "continuous." Although the
use need not be constant orfrequent,it must be established that the public "made a continuous
and uninterrupted use . . . as often as they found it convenient or necessary." Boyer v. Clark, 326
P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1958). That is, the "use may be continuous though not constant. ..
provided it occurred as often as the claimant [the public] had occasion or chose to pass"
Richards v. Pine Ranch, Inc., 597 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977).
Any action that interrupts the public's use of a road, therefore, will prevent a public
dedication. For example, in Draper City v. Bernardo, the Utah Supreme Court reversed an order
granting summary judgment based on the defendants' affidavits stating that they had posted the
property "no trespassing," sought law enforcement help to prevent trespass and ordered
numerous trespassers to leave their property. 889 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah 1995). In so
doing, it distinguished that case from its decision in Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah
1981):
We distinguish the instant case from Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d
at 450, where we upheld the dedication of a private road to the
5

public under section 27-12-89. In Thurman, the general public had
never been asked not to use the road, and the county sheriff had not
been asked to prevent trespassing. Id. at 449. In contrast, there are
averments in the instant case that trespassers were directed to leave
and that the county sheriff and the Draper City police were often
asked to prevent this illegal activity.
Id. at 1101. See also Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d at 310; Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910,
913 (Utah App. 1996); Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981); and
Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d at 108-09, wherein there was no evidence of anyone having been asked
to leave the landowner's private property.
A.

The Evidence of Record Supports the Trial Court's Finding That the
Side Roads Were Not Continuously Used by the Public.

In this instance, there is evidence that the private property on which the Side Roads are
located was posted "no trespassing," that from 1949 until 1993 trespassers were routinely
ordered to leave the private property, including the Stansbury Road and Side Roads, and that as
trespass problems increased, during the late 1970s and 1980s Appellants' sought the assistance
of the Tooele County Sheriff to help prevent trespass.
1-

Members of the Public Were Routinely Ordered to Leave the Private
Property.

Appellants introduced evidenced that from 1949 until 1993 members of the public were
routinely ordered to leave their private property along the Stansbury Road. Specifically, for the
time period from 1949 to 1977, the pertinent evidence of record is as follows:2

2

In the Brief of Appellee at p. 4, it asserts that there is no evidence that the landowners prior to 1977
treated the land adjacent to the Stansbury Road as private property. Given the testimony set forth
herein it is evident that the State has failed to marshal the evidence and, therefore, its contention that
the record does not establish any interruption in public use prior to 1977 should be disregarded.
AWINCCorp. v. Simonsen, 2005 Ut App. 168, f 110, 112P.2d 1228, 1230.
6

Dale Castagno. Dale Castagno testified that between 1950 and
1955, whenever he or his father observed people trespassing, they
ordered them to leave by directing them to go all the way off of the
grazing allotment to the south end of the Island. (R. 1151 at 412,
418, 423-425; R. 1939-1943.) Likewise, during this same time
period he testified that he also witnessed Ed Cassity do the same.
(R. 1151 at 418; R. 1942-43.)
Further, Dale Castagno testified that from 1960 to 1975 he leased
the Castagno property as winter range and continued to order
trespassers to get all the way off the private property by going to
the south end of the Island. (R. 1151 at 416-18, 423-25;
R. 1945-46.) During this same time period, he further testified that
he also observed Ed Cassity do the same. (R. 1151 at 418.)
John Bleazard. John Bleazard testified that growing up he was
present when his grandfather (Ed Cassity) ordered trespassers to
leave the private property and go all the way to the south end of the
Island where the public lands are located. (R. 1150 at 296-98.)
Mark Bleazard. Mark Bleazard testified that when he was twelve
or thirteen years old (1950 or 1951) he witnessed his grandfather
(Ed Cassity) stop and confront several trespassers by shooting a
rifle over their heads and then had them get in to the back of his
pickup so that he could drive them to the south end of the Island
where he told them not to come back. (R. 1151 at 438-39.)
Keith "Eddie" Wanlass. In his affidavit Ed Wanlass states, "I have
been with my grandparents and others several times when he asked
people with guns to leave their private property as well as leased
land [public lands] if cattle or horses were out there." (R. 14981502.)
Charles "Butch" Durfee. In his affidavit Charles Durfee states that
between 1963 and 1974 he once witnessed Ed Cassity order
trespassers off his private land. (R. 1272-78.)
During trial, however, he acknowledged that in fact he was present
on multiple occasions when he witnessed Ed Cassity kick people
off his private property, including one memorable incident where
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he confronted four trespassers who were hunting along the side of
the Stansbury Road:3 (R. 1151 at 449-51.)
Likewise, for the time period from 1977 to 1993, there also exists substantial evidence
that trespassers were ordered to leave the private property.
John Bleazard. Between 1977 and 1993, John Bleazard testified
that he repeatedly ordered numerous trespassers to leave the
private property along the Cable Gate Road, Pass Canyon Road,
the South Road and the Stansbury Road. (R. 1150 at 310-12, 32425, 371, 384-86.) In addition, John Bleazard testified that
commencing in the last 1970s and continuing through the 1980s,
he sought the assistance of the Tooele County Sheriffs Office to
prevent trespass which issued citations for trespassing, including
people who had vehicles parked along the road. (R. 1150 at 31213.) Further, John Bleazard testified that the Sheriffs Department
provided to him numerous booklets of warning tickets which he
would fill out and place a copy of on people's vehicles parked
along the road. (R. 1150 at 314-15.)
Craig Smith. From 1983 through 1993 Craig Smith testified he
was an employee of Six Mile Ranch Company and, in connection
therewith, he ordered people to leave the private property,
including Cable Gate Road and Pass Canyon Road. (R. 1151 at
428-30.)

3

Mr. Durfee's testimony regarding this incident wais as follows:
Anyway, we were going down the road and one guy in particular was about 30, 40 yards
off the road and they were scattered. This was on the, they'd be on the west side of the
road and he had some cattle down in those sand knolls and anyway they were scattered
down through that area on the line going down along through the sage brush and the one
guy was about 30, 40 yards off the road and Ed stopped and called him over to the truck,
and asked him "Did you see that sign?" '"No," he said. "Didn't you see that sign?" And
the guy said "What sign?" And I don't know if I should get into this or not but that was
like setting off a fuse to the dynamite to Ed if you denied seeing the sign that in plain
view, which obviously their car was parked past that sign so they drove right past it.
Anyway, Ed, he made the guy get on the running board of the pickup and he was going to
take him back and show him the sign and on the way back - we were going in reverse
and anyway at that particular time, Ed called this guy everything but a white man. So the
guy jumped off the running board and said "I don't have to take that from you." But
anyway, Ed made all the guys get together and told them to get off the Island. (R. 1151
at 450-51.)

R

Craig Bleazard. Craig Bleazard testified that on several occasions
he witnessed John Bleazard order people to leave not only the
private property located on the Stansbury Road, but also the
Stansbury Road itself. (R. 1150 at 387-88.)
The evidence of record, therefore, supports the trial court's conclusion that from 1949 to
1993 the landowner (or their lessees) who were using the Island for winter grazing routinely
ordered members of the public to leave the private property, including the Stansbury Road and
Side Roads, In addition, the record evidences that Appellants, during the late 1970s and
continuing through the 1980s, sought the help of the Tooele County Sheriffs Office to prevent
peoplefromtrespassing on their private property, including the Side Roads.
Contrary to the State's assertion, therefore, substantial evidence exists to support the trial
court's findings the public's use of the Side Roads was not continuous.
2.

The Record Supports the Trial Court's Finding that the Property Along the
Stansbury Road Including the Side Roads was Posted "No Trespassing."

By arguing that there did not exist any "no trespassing" signs at the entrance to the Pass
Canyon and Gated Cable Roads, the State is implicitly contesting the trial court's finding that the
private property located to the sides of the Stansbury Road, including the Side Roads, was posted
"no trespassing." (R. 1136, Findings of Fact ffl[52 & 57; and R 1140, Conclusions of Law
% 17.) The State, however, has failed to marshal the evidence in support thereof and, therefore,
this court must assume that finding to be accurate. Young v Young, 1999 UT 3, % 15, 979 P.2d
338.
In any event, the trial court's finding that the lands along the Stansbury Road were posted
"no trespassing," including the Side Roads, is supported by the record. John Bleazard testified
that for as long as he can remember the private property was posted "no trespassing" not only at
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the point where the Stansbury Road enters onto private property, but also where the road left the
land of one landowner and entered onto another. (R. 1150 at 293-97.) See also Appellants'
Brief at pp. 20-21. In each such instance, John Bleazard testified the signs were located to the
side of the road facing on-coming traffic and were intended to refer to the entirety of the private
property, including the Stansbury Road and Side Roads. (R. 1150 at 293-97.) Consistent
therewith, the evidence demonstrates that trespassers were routinely ordered off of the lands
adjacent to the Stansbury Road, including the Side Roads. See Part I. A. 1 above.
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Add Dispositive Requirements to Those Set
Forth in Section 72-5-104.

The State's assertion that the trial court improperly added disposition requirements to
those set forth in Section 72-5-104 is without merit. Although Appellants agree that the fact a
public entity has not designated a road to be public or maintained it as such is not dispositive,
there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the court treated those findings as such.
Likewise, the trial court's finding that landowners treated the land along the Stansbury Road as
private property, including the Side Roads, does not support the conclusion that the trial court
treated the landowners "intent" as dispositive. Rather, this finding is merely supportive of its
ultimate finding that the landowners "routinely" ordered people to leave their property.
Clearly, the trial court's conclusion that the Side Roads had not been dedicated to public
use is based on its finding that the landowners posted the property "no trespassing," sought the
assistance of law enforcement to prevent trespass and "routinely" ordered members of the public
to leave the private property, thereby interrupting the public's use thereof See, e.g., Draper
City, 888 R2d at 1099-1100.
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C.

The State's Contention That Appellants Lacked the Authority to
Order Trespassers Off the Castagno Parcels is Without Merit

By arguing that Appellants lacked any legal right to order people to leave the Castagno
property, the State is improperly attempting to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. This
issue was not raised in the State's trial brief, was not addressed during opening arguments and
was not argued by the State in its closing arguments. As a consequence, neither the Appellants
or the trial court addressed this issue below and no findings have been entered concerning the
factual issues raised thereby. This court, therefore, should not address this issue. State v. Lopez,
886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994).
In any event, the State's argument is without merit. First, the mere fact that Appellants
did not own the Castagno parcels does not, by itself, support the conclusion a person lacked the
legal authority to order trespassers to leave. Here, the record evidences that the owners of the
Castagno and Cassity parcels are related to one another and have historically allowed their lands
to be utilized by each other as "open range." (R. 1150 at 283-86, R. 1151 at 423-24.) Based on
this long standing practice (R. 1151 at 423-24), the record discloses that the landowners (or their
lessees) who wintered cattle on the Island have been throwing trespassers off each other's
property since the 1950s. Given that the Appellant's were being allowed to run cattle on the
Castagno parcels, absent evidence to the contrary, there is no basis to assume that Appellants
lacked the authority to protect their interests by ordering trespassers to leave. During the trial,
however, not a single landowner disputed Appellants' right to order trespassers to leave their
property or repudiated their actions in doing so.
In addition, since 1952, Ed Cassity and later Appellant's have owned various parcels of
land over which the Stansbury Road is located, including thefirsttwo miles thereof See State's
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Brief, Illustration One p. 8. Thus, a person using the Cable Gate Road would have had to have
already trespassed across more than two miles of Appellants' land and would have to trespass
back over those lands to leave the Island. Clearly, a landowner has the right to order such people
to go south below where their lands are located.
In conclusion, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that trespassers were
routinely ordered off of the lands located along the Stansbury Road, including the Side Roads.
Contrary to the argument of the State, this evidence covers the entire time period from
1949-1993, and not just the period after 1977. Moreover, it is also clear that Appellant's had the
legal right to order trespassers using the Cable Gate Road to go all the way south below their
lands.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's finding that the public did not continuously
use must be affirmed.4
n.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
STANSBURY ROAD HAD BEEN DEDICATED TO THE PUBLIC.

The trial court erred in concluding that the Stansbury Road had been dedicaled to public
use. First, given the trial court's finding that trespassers were "routinely" ordered to leave the
private property located along the Stansbury Road (Addendum A, pp. 12-16,ffl[53, 59, 64 & 17)
and "occasionally" ordered to leave the Stansbuiy Road itself (Addendum A, pp. 7-8, 1flJ27 &
31), the trial court erred in concluding that the public's use of the road was "continuous."
Second, given the uncontraverted evidence of the State's own witnesses that the owners of the
Castagno parcels knowingly and willfully permitted the public to recreate on their private

4

For reasons set forth in Appellants' Brief at pp. 24-35 and Part n.B of this brief, it is also
Appellants' contention that the use of the Cable Gate Road was "permissive."
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property, the trial court erred in concluding that the recreational use of the Stansbury Road was
as a "public thoroughfare."
A.

As A Matter Of Law, The Trial Court Erred In Concluding That The
Use Of The Stansbury Road Was Continuous.

In response to Appellant's brief, the State does not dispute the trial court found members
of the public were "routinely" ordered to leave the Side Roads and "occasionally" ordered to
leave the Stansbury Road. Further, the State dies not dispute that the testimony on which these
findings are necessarily based evidences that in these instances the trespassers were ordered to go
all the way off the private property to the south end of the Island. Rather, the State argues that:
(1)

These actions constitute "insignificant intermissions," rather than an interruption
in the public's continuous use of the road;

(2)

These actions only involved people who were bothering cattle, shooting guns or
littering; and

(3)

In any event, the trial court's other unchallenged findings of fact compel this court
to affirm the trial court's conclusion the road was continuously used by the public.

The State's arguments miss the point and otherwise lack merit.
1.

The Trial Court's Express Findings of Fact are Inconsistent with its
Conclusion the Stansbury Road was Continuously Used by the Public.

As discussed in Part I above, in order for a public dedication to occur the public must
have been able to use the road "as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass." See, e.g.,
Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809, quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc. 599 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah
1977). In the present instance, however, the trial court found that the public was not able to use
the Stansbury Road wherever they choose. Specifically, the trial court expressly found that
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members of the public were on "occasion" ordered to leave the Stansbury Road and to go south
off the private property (Addendum A at pp 7-8, ff 27 & 31) It follows therefrom that the
public was not able to use the Stansbury Road on every occasion it chose to pass and, therefore,
as a matter of law the public's use of the road was not continuous
In addition, the trial court also found the members of the public were "routinely" ordered
to leave the private property along the Stansbury Road

(R 1136-1140 f 53, 59, 64 & 17)

Although these findings do not specify where the people were ordered to go,5 the findings are
necessarily based on of the witnesses who testified in this regard - Dale Castagno, John
Bleazard, Mark Bleazard, Craig Smith, Keith E Wanlass and Charles Durfee As set forth in
Part IA 1 above, in every such instance these witnesses testified either that these trespassers
were ordered to the south end of the Island onto public lands or to leave the "private property "
Conversely, not a single witness testified as to a single instance in which a trespasser was merely
asked to get back onto the Stansbury Road Given that these trespassers were ordered to get all
the way off of the private property by going to the south end of the Island, in every such
instance, therefore, they were also denied the use of the Stansbury Road
Despite the foregoing, the State attempts to brush aside these findings and underlying
evidence as demonstrating nothing more than "insignificant intermissions" in the public's use of
the road, citing the Campbell and Thurman cases The State's reliance on these decisions is
misplaced

Supportive of Appellant's position, the Campbell decision holds that "the public

must have been able to use the road whenever they found it necessary or convenient" 962 P 2d
5

In Finding of Fact No 31 the court finds that on "several occasions" people were ordered to go
south onto public lands (Appellants' Bnef Addendum at p 8 ) Given that the trial court found
trespassers were routmely ordered to leave the pnvate lands, this finding does not answer where the
rest were sent if not to the south end
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at 809. Hence, because the landowners in that case occasionally blocked the road by means of a
locked gate, this court concluded that the use of the road was not continuous. Id Similarly, in
Thurman there was no evidence of any members of the public having ever been told to leave the
road, the lands along the road were fenced off from the road and the sheriffs office had only
been requested to prevent trespass on the lands adjacent to the road. Except for periodically
blocking the road to facilitate the movement of sheep, there was no evidence whatsoever that the
public was prevented from using the road. 626 P.2d at 449.
2.

The Trial Court Erred in Differentiating Between the General Public and
Those People Who Were Ordered to Leave Because They Were Hunting.
Shooting Guns, Harassing Cattle or Littering.

In Finding of Fact No. 30, the trial court found that "Ed Cassity... as well as other
owners and stock raisers, differentiated between the public's use of the road by the public and
those who used guns around the cattle operations, either on the Stansbury Road or on private
property."6 (Addendum A at p. 8.) Although the testimony was not limited to ordering people to
leave the Stansbury Road who were shooting guns, hunting, littering, etc. (see Part LA. 1 above),
most of the specific incidents recounted by the witnesses involved such conduct. In part, this is
because the landowners (or their lessees) who ran cattle on the Island used it for winter range
and, therefore, were mostly out on the Island during the winter season. (R. 1708-10, R. 426.)

6

During the hearing on August 5, 2004, Judge Skanchy explained his finding regarding whether
trespassers were ordered to leave the Stansbury Road as follows:
I think that my finding was based upon the fact that it appears to be that the evidence
presented at trial over a historical period was that people were given unrestricted use
of that roadway. If there was something that offended one of the owners, particularly
hunting, either shooting off the roadway at something that could be close to cattle or
being off the roadway itself, which seemed to be the bulk of what testimony I heard,
that those people were given their marching orders and asked to leave the property.
And so that's the distinction I made. (R. 355 at 12.)
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During the winter, the primary reason people would go out on to the Island during the winter was
to go hunting or shooting. (R. 411.) The preferred way to hunt in the winter was from the back
of a truck while driving down the Stansbury Road. (R. 1498-1502.)
Even assuming, however, the landowners (or their lessees) only ordered people who were
hunting or shooting to leave the Stansbury Road, it does not follow that the public's use of the
road was continuous. Everyone who used the Stansbury Road did, for one reason or another, to
go camping, hiking, horseback riding, Easter egg hunting, etc. It is axiomatic that a private
property owner has the right to chose who can or cannot enjoy the use of his or her private
property. The fact that Ed Cassity may have only chosen to order to leave people who were
engaged in objectionable conduct does not exclude these people from the categoiy of public
users. Whatever may have been Ed Cassity's (or the other landowners or lessees) motivation in
ordering such people to leave, they were nevertheless members of the public who were denied
the use of the Stansbury Road.
In any event, the trial court's finding that trespassers were "routinely" ordered to leave
the lands along the Stansbury Road is not limited to such instances. As discussed above, given
that these trespassers were ordered all of the way off the private property, each of these instances
also denied these members of the public the use of the Stansbury Road.
3.

Given the Trial Court's Express Findings, the State's Reliance on the Trial
Court's Other Findings of Fact is Misplaced.

Finally, the State argues that the trial court's other unchallenged findings demonstrate
that the Stansbury Road was continuously used by the public. Specifically, the State references
the trial court's finding that (1) other landowners believed or treated the Stansbury Road as
public; (2) the Stansbury Road was a class B road; (3) the public used the road for a variety of
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recreational activities; and (4) that the vast majority of the general public did not seek permission
to use the road nor were they asked to leave the road.
While Appellants agree that these findings may be probative of a public dedication, these
findings do not in and of themselves establish either that the public's use was continuous or that
such use was as a public thoroughfare. In this instance, the trial court expressly found that the
public was routinely ordered to leave the lands along the road and occasionally ordered to leave
the road itself. In light of these express findings, the State's reliance on these other findings is
misplaced.
B.

The Public's Use of the Stansbury Road Was Permissive.

On appeal, the State does not dispute that the trial court erred in relying on the use of the
Stansbury Road by the various commercial enterprises and their invitees, and the State, BLM and
county employees in finding that the Stansbury Road was used continuously as a public
thoroughfare. Nevertheless, the State contends that this is "immaterial since most of the use of
the Stansbury Road was by members of the public that do not fall within the category of
permissive users." Brief of Appellee at p. 26.
As set forth in Appellant's Brief, the uncontraverted testimony of the State's own
witnesses establishes that private landowners on the Island knowingly and willfully allowed the
public to recreate on their private lands. Appellants' Brief at pp. 30-32. Accordingly, it was
Appellant's contention below that since the use of the private property was permissive, the use of
the Stansbury Road to access that property must also have been permissive.
In rejecting this argument the trial court concluded:
One cannot rationally, or successfully argue that permitting anyone
and everyone to use the Stansbury Road "as long as they behaved
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themselves," made the public permissive users. Rather, such usage
is the grist upon which public dedication is ground . . . . An overt
act is required by the owner to distinguish the general public from
a permissive user. An overt act may be to unlock a gate for a
limited time period, or give a pass to certain individuals, or to
openly declare that a particular person, or class of persons, are
permitted to use the property, while others are not. No such
distinctions were made here, as the public was able to use the
Stansbury Road as itfound it necessary and convenient.
R. 1030-31 (emphasis added).
In other words, the trial court concluded that a private landowner cannot permit the
general public as a whole to recreate on his or her own land or, at least, if a landowner does so,
the public's use is not "permissive." This conclusion of the trial court is erroneous.
In Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d at 806, the landowner opened a gate so the
general public could use the road during the deer season. Based thereon, this court affirmed the
trial court's conclusion that the public's use of the road was permissive:
In this case, the trail court concluded that the deer hunters used
Ridge Road with the Campbell's permission. The trial court based
this conclusion on testimony at the hearing that the Campbells had
unlocked the gate every year except 1994 for deer hunting season
and had relocked it at the end of each hunting reason. The trial
court correctly concluded that permissive use of Ridge Road could
not result in dedication as a public thoroughfare.
Id Likewise, in Heber City, the general public was allowed to use the road to access a municipal
airport. In concluding that use of the road by the general public was permissive, the Utah
Supreme Court stated that: ". . . the public's use of the Airport Road simply to go to and from
the airport is of the permissive nature that will not lead to a dedication and abandonment to the
public, as this is precisely how Heber City wanted the road used." 942 P.2d at 312, fh. 10.
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The trial court's conclusion is also inconsistent with the express public policy of State of
Utah. As set forth in the Recreational User's Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-1 (2004), it is the
purpose of that act "to encourage public and private owners of land to make land and water areas
available to the public for recreational purposes...."

Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-1. It is

incongruous for the State on one hand to encourage private landowners to allow the public to
recreate on their private land and, on the other hand, for the trial court to conclude that the
public's use thereof is not permissive.
HI.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PUBLIC'S INTEREST IN THE STANSBURY ROAD EXTENDS
ACROSS THE MAGCORP PARCEL TO THE GATE ON THE
NORTH DIKE.

The State makes three arguments in support of the trial court's finding that the public's
interest in the road extends all the way to the gate on the MagCorp Dike. First, the State argues
that Appellants' are improperly attempting to raise this issue for the first time on appeal.
Second, the State argues Appellants* failed to marshal the evidence. Finally, the State argues the
evidence supports the trial court's findings.
A.

The Appellants9 Raised the Issue Concerning the State's Ownership
of the MagCorp Parcel Below.

During the trial, Appellants established that the MagCorp Parcel was purchased from the
State of Utah in the mid to late 1960s on a twenty year installment contract and, therefore,
MagCorp did not receive legal title thereto until the mid to late 1980s. (R. 1149 at 151.) Based
thereon, during closing arguments Appellant asserted that the road across the MagCorp Parcel
could not be a public road as a matter of law. (R. 1151 at 485-87.) Thus, the State's contention
that Appellants failed to raise this issue below is false.
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B+

Appellants Did Not Fail to Marshall the Evidence.

In support of Appellant's contention that the State failed to establish a public dedication
all the way to the meander line of the Great Salt Lake, Appellants referred this court to every
scrap of evidence of public use across the MagCorp parcel. Contrary to the Stated; belief, the
additional evidence set forth in its brief is not probative of any additional public use.
Specifically, the boilerplate statements in the affidavits attesting to the affiants having used the
road "all the way to the northern tip of the West Stansbury Island . . ." does not evidence public
use across the MagCorp parcel. This is because the Cable Gate Road is the only road that
accesses the northern tip of the Island and it is undisputed that the turnofffor that road is prior to
the MagCorp parcel. See Appellee's Brief at p. 8., Illustration One. Moreover, the statements of
the affiants that they "also witnessed other members of the public who would drive to the end of
the road. . ." lacks specificity and is inconsistent with the maps attached by the affiants
specifying the portions of the roads they actually used.
Appellants, therefore, properly marshaled every scrap of evidence pertaining to the
public's use of this portion of the road.
C.

The Evidence Does Not Support the Trial Court's Finding.

As set forth in Appellants' Brief, Part II. A, for the entire time period from 1949-1993, the
only members of the general public the State established used the Stansbury Road across the
MagCorp parcel to the meander line of the Great Salt Lake were Neldo Lemmon, Sam
Wingfield, Jr. and Howard Murray,
Paragraph 4 of Mr. Lemmon's affidavit only evidences he and his family driving out onto
the Dike on one occasion. (R. 1402-05.) Whether or not he did that on more than on occasion is
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unknown, but given his affidavit states that he helped livestock operators out on the Island during
the 1960s and 1970s, any such use may well have been permissive. Likewise, although the
affidavit of Sam Wingfield evidences that he also used the road all the way to the Dike (R. 151925), it is uncontraverted that he also went out on the Island with John Bleazard to hunt. Thus, we
also do not know whether his use of the road across the MagCorp parcel was permissive or not.
Finally, the map attached to Howard Murray's indicates that he used to road all the way to the
meander line but is silent as to how often this occurred.
Clearly, affidavits evidencing the use of a road by three people that are silent as to when
and how often this use occurred is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a public dedication.
Further, this portion of the Stansbury Road did not even exist until 1965 and has been posted "no
trespassing" since that time. The uncontraverted evidence of record establishes that the vast
majority of people using the Stansbury Road would stop and turn around when they came into
sight of the "no trespassing" sign. This action, therefore, demonstrates the public did not feel
free to use that portion of the road whenever they wanted and, therefore, no public dedication
occurred.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING ORDINANCE 93-9
INVALID.

As discussed in Appellants' Brief, the only issues before the Utah Supreme Court in State
v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, 44 P.3d 680 were (1) whether Section 27-12-102.4 required mail
notice in addition to notice by publication and (2) whether the State was an abutting landowner
of record without the meaning of that statute. Thus, the issue as to whether the State was entitled
to mail notice regardless as to whether the portion of the Stansbury Road that abuts sovereign
land was a "public" road was not before the Supreme Court in Tooele County, had not been
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addressed by the trial court, and had not been briefed by the parties. The Utah Supreme Court's
holding in Tooele County that if the State's property located below the meander line of the Great
Salt Lake abuts the Stansbury Road uas described in the County's proposed vacation notice,"
then the ordinance is null and void, therefore, is dicta that should not have been followed by the
trial court for several reasons.
A.

The Dicta in Tooele County is Inconsistent with the Plain Language of
Section 27-12-102.4.

In pertinent part, Section 27-12-102.4 requires mail notice to be provided "to all owners
of record of land abutting the county road proposed to be vacated" (emphasis added). Based
upon its express language, therefore, Section 27-12-104.4 only requires mail notice to
landowners who abut a county road.
B.

The Dicta in Tooele County Is Not Necessary to Effectuate the
Statutory Purpose for Requiring Written Notice.

It is well settled that an abutting landowner to a public road has a right of reasonable
access to his or her property. See e.g., Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982);
Mason v. State, 656 P.2d 465, 469 (Utah 1982); and Bailey Services & Supply Corp., 533 P.2d
882, 883-84 (Utah 1975). Thus, an abutting landowner to a public road has a separate and
distinct interest from that of the general public. It is undoubtedly for this reason that Section
27-12-102.4 required actual notice by mail to such abutting landowners.
Assuming the public portion, if any, of the Stansbury Road does not extend to sovereign
lands, the State would not have an interest in the road separate and distinct from the general
public. It follows therefrom that the statutory purpose would not be undermined by allowing
Appellants in this case to assert the State was not entitled to written notice in the first place.
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C

The Dicta in Tooele Count Unnecessarily Undermines the Decisions of
Duly Elected Legislative Bodies.

In instances such as the present, where the scope and extent of the public's interest in a
road is unknown, common sense dictates that a county should do exactly as Tooele County did include in the legal description of the road proposed to be vacated the entire road in question and
provide mail notice to all the abutting landowners thereof.
In circumstances where an abutting landowner did not receive mail notice and initiates a
lawsuit seeking to set aside the ordinance, however, public policy favors allowing a party to
assert that the landowner was not entitled to written notice in the first place. Specifically, a
court's would not thereby unnecessarily be setting aside decisions of a duly elected legislative
body and be furthering the public interest in citizens being able to rely on the decisions of such
duly elected legislative bodies.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this court should declare Ordinance 93-9 valid. In the
alternative, this court should reverse the trial court's judgment that the Stansbury Road was
dedicated to the public and affirm the trial court's judgment that the Side Roads had not been so
dedicated.
DATED this J9

day of September 2005.

Brent A. Bohman
Attorney for Six Mile Ranch Company,
Craig Bleazard, Mark C. Bleazard and John
C. Bleazard
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Douglas Ahlstrom
Tooele County Attorney
47 South Main
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Stephen Schwendiman
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
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P.O. Box 140815
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0815
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